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TNTEGRAL TO the agenda of the Diplomatic Conference on
LPrivate Air Law of the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) of May 1999 was the Draft Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air. This
document, which was adopted as a full-blown convention' by the
states parties to the convention on May 28, 1999, seeks to re-
place the existing Warsaw Convention of 19292 in its totality.
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.3
From its inception, this provision has proved contentious in
its application as courts adjudicating claims under Article 17
have conservatively interpreted the phrase "bodily injury" as
either pure physical injury or mental suffering accompanied by
physical injury where the latter was a causative factor in bringing
about the former. These rulings held that there could not be
compensation under Article 17 for pure mental shock, psychic
trauma, anxiety, or mental discomfort. In the 1991 case of East-
* DLC (McGill), LL.M (Monash), LL.B (Colombo), FRAeS, FCIT. The au-
thor, who is a senior official at the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), has written this article in his personal capacity, and therefore its con-
tents and views should not be attributed to his position in the ICAO Secretariat.
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the International
Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc 9740.
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted at 49
U.S.C. App. 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at art. 17.
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ern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,4 the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that there must at least be physical manifestation of
injury, if not death or physical injury, in order for a claimant to
successfully sue an air carrier under Article 17. The Court, how-
ever, did not address the issue as to whether mental injury ac-
companied by physical injury was a compensable element. The
Floyd decision is consistent with its precursor-the 1974 case of
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.' which related to a hijacking
incident-holding that there must be palpable, objective, bodily
injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma related to the
incident, and the damage must flow from the bodily injuries and
not from the trauma itself. The Rosman decision followed in the
wake of a 1973 decision which held the same.6
The inclination of the courts to insist on pure physical injury
as an essential element of compensability is arguable due to the
reason that courts took refuge in the original French terminol-
ogy of the Convention which was Msion corporelle which means in
the French language "physical wound" as against lsion mentale
which means "mental wound."7
A diametrically opposed view emerged in a cursus curiae which
ignored the connotations of the French language and visited the
original intention of the drafters of the Convention. In Husserl
v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,8 also a case concerning the hijacking of
an aircraft, the court observed the lacuna relating to the ab-
sence of reference to emotional injury in Article 17 and deemed
fit to construe the provision broadly to include injuries other
than pure physical injury.
This polarization of views will be moot once courts start to
apply the new ICAO Convention, which has gone through sev-
eral drafts through the ICAO Legal Committee. In its first draft,
the new Convention, under Article 16, provided as follows:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury or mental injury of a passenger upon condition only
that the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not
4 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
5 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
6 See Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
7 For a detailed discussion on this subject see Caroline Desbiens, Air Carrier's
Liability for Emotional Distress Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: Can It Still Be
Invoked? in 17 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 153, 159-166 (1992).
8 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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liable if the death or injury resulted solely from the state of
health of the passenger.9
This draft, which was the result of the deliberations of the
ICAO Study Group on the subject in 1995, underwent further
revision at a later stage of the Group's deliberations, which in-
troduced the element of personal injury into the provision to
cover both physical and mental injury. However, the final draft
submitted to the May 1999 Diplomatic Conference reads:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable to the extent
that the death or injury resulted from the state of health of the
passenger.10
The reintroduction of the words "bodily injury" and the re-
moval of "personal and mental injury" could be interpreted
either way-that the final draft intended retaining exclusively
physical injury with no hint of mental injury, or, that mental
injury is imputed to bodily injury, taking into consideration the
emergent trend of linking mental injury with a tangible bodily
injury.
Although courts have been somewhat preoccupied with the
term bodily injury as against mental injury, the crux of the mat-
ter essentially lies earlier in the provision which speaks of "dam-
age caused." The 1996 Supreme Court decision in Zicherman v.
Korean Air Lines Co.11 ruled that it was quite evident that the Eng-
lish word "damage" or "harm," which was reflected in the official
French text of the Convention as "dommage," has a wide appli-
cation and was, in fact, used by the Warsaw Convention drafters
in its classical French law sense of legally cognizable harm. The
Zicherman decision incontrovertibly brings to bear the compel-
ling significance of legally cognizable harm as being a compen-
sable element and therefore admits of mental injury as damage
under Article 17, if the domestic law applicable to a case were to
deem mental injury as such. The operative issue therefore re-
mains as to whether mental injury is a legally cognizable harm.
9 See Report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consolidation of the Warsaw
System AvIATiON Q., July 1997, at 286, 313.
10 Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, May 3, 1999, art. 16.1, DCWDoc No. 4 (emphasis added).
11 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
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This article will discuss scientific and forensic implications of
mental injury as interpreted by the medical and legal profes-
sions, with a view to extrapolating the possible future outlook
for the damage as a compensable element in private air carrier
liability.
II. THE NATURE OF MENTAL DISTRESS
The law, as any other human discipline, has treated the mind
as an unfathomable abstraction. Through the years, this atti-
tude has led to a blend of caution and curiosity.12 This led to a
compromise to give legal recognition to an injury to the human
mind i" only when it was accompanied by some physical attribute
perceptible to the senses. To the lawyer, it remains a mere legal
platitude which still exerts a strong influence on the attitude of
the courts towards tortious liability.
Although it can be seen that this attitude has acted as a perva-
sive influence in restricting the award of damages for pain of
mind, a closer study of recent trends reveals an interesting de-
velopment. Legal writing, sociological change, and scientific de-
velopments have prompted the courts in the United States to
show signs of recognizing the infliction of mental distress as be-
ing compatible with the legal definition of a tort. Mere pain of
mind has hitherto been recognized as being abstract and inde-
finable in terms of visual assessment. It is this quality which has
cautioned the courts against fraudulent and frivolous actions.
However, it is clear that mental distress, once identified and de-
fined, can be considered a damage for the purpose of the law of
torts.
It is a curious fact that the courts in the United States and the
United Kingdom recognize a set of torts as actionable wrongs.
Had they pondered over a suitable definition of a tort, they
would have realized that defining a tort is as difficult as defining
mental distress. Conceptually, a tort remains a breach of duty
which grounds an action for damages. This excludes contrac-
tual or quasi-contractual duty. Thus far, the courts have not
been overtly concerned about the question, "What is a tort?"
12 See Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861) where Lord Wen-
sleydale said that "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone .... "
13 Hereafter, injury to the human mind, mental distress, pain of mind, emo-
tional distress, and other similar references mean any influence on the human
mind which would temporarily or permanently upset the mental stability of a
person, sufficient to cause discomfort to the mind.
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Rather, they have sought an answer to the question, "What are
torts?" A treatise on torts says, "A 'tort' is simply the Norman
word for a 'wrong,' but 'torts' have typically been distinguished
from . . . 'wrongs' identified with contractual relations. Tort
law, then, is concerned with civil wrongs not arising from
contracts. "14
Normally, definitions of tort refer to harm or damage caused
to the injured as a requirement for the award of damages. As
mentioned earlier, generally the courts have been hesitant to
consider mental distress as damage, as it has been considered to
be incapable of assessment. In sharp contrast is the view taken
by some early writers15 that mental suffering is indeed damage
and an injury upon the human being and therefore should be
considered a tort. It is submitted that such a view is more ac-
ceptable as it is based both on scientific and sociological studies.
The society we live in today is far more complex and varie-
gated than the ones before the twentieth century. Rising popu-
lation, expanding industry, and increasing production have
exposed man to many more hazards than before. The inci-
dence of mental injury in today's society can be expected to
grow. As White says, " [e] motional distress was the stuff of 'real'
life in twentieth-century America, and hence the stuff of tort
law." 16
It is no surprise therefore, that when Prosser called the inflic-
tion of mental distress a separate and independent tort,17 he was
acutely aware of the reluctance of the courts to consider mental
distress as a damage or harm, and thus regard its infliction as a
tort. Whether mental distress causes damage and whether it can
be assessed is worthy of discussion.
In the area of tortious liability, it cannot be disputed that an
imbalance of a person's mental equilibrium is inextricably re-
lated to fear. If one looks at a definition of "fear," its relation-
ship with pain of mind caused by a civil wrong becomes
immediately apparent. "The word 'fear' comes from the old
English 'Faer' for sudden calamity or danger and was later used
to describe the emotion of uneasiness caused by the sense of
14 G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA xi n. * (1980).
15 See, eg., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 327-28 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; WHITE, supra note 14, at 102; William L. Pros-
ser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874
(1939) [hereinafter Intentional].
16 WHITE, supra note 14, at 106.
17 Intentional, supra note 15, at 892.
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impending danger.""8 Fear is "[a] normal response to active or
imagined threat in higher animals and comprises an outer
behavioural expression, an inner feeling and accompanying
physiological damage."'19
Much has been written in detail of the aggression committed
by the feeling of fear and anxiety on the internal organs of the
human body. Fear is said to have been "born of innumerable
injuries in the course of evolution... developed into portentous
foreshadowing of possible injury... capable of arousing in the
body, all of the offensive and defensive activities that favour the
survival of the organism. 20
Emotional agitation, anxiety or fear is known to bring about
an imbalance in the digestive process, 21 dryness of the mouth ,22
an increase in blood sugar,2 - and a general disruption of the
internal organs of the human body. This feeling of discomfort,
even though temporary, is a positively unpleasant experience.24
The observations made so far by medical authorities seem to
clearly recognize the deleterious effects of pain of mind. There
is no justification, therefore, for rejecting his motion in limine, as
being beyond human perception. However, it is difficult to to-
tally reject the point made by the courts in the United States
that mental distress when inflicted should not be recognized as
an actionable tort as it is difficult to prove and therefore would
give rise to arbitrary and frivolous suits. The notion of mental
distress, even though easily recognizable as damage, has to be
considered with care. The plaintiffs case has to be viewed with
circumspection, which could be done by imposing stringent
standards of proof of injury on the plaintiff.
Although the early view taken by the courts that the infliction
of mental distress should not be entertained at all due to its
vagueness was totally acceptable to them in the context of the
time it was followed, modern science, which has drawn a distinct
18 IssAACz M. MARKS, FEARS AND PHOBIAS 1 (1969).
19 Id.
20 CL XIII Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, 893 (1910).
21 See WALTER B. CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR AND RAGE
253-54 (2d ed. 1953).
22 See id. at 325-26.
23 See WALTER B. CANNON, THE WISDOM OF THE HUMAN BODY 276 (rev. and
enlarged ed. 1939).
24 For internal changes causing discomfort, see generally Roy R. Grinker, The
Physiology of Emotions in THE PHYSIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS: REPORT OF THE THIRD AN-
NUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS IN NORTHERN CALIFOR-
NIA, SAN FRANCISCO 16-16 at 17-15 (Alexander Simon et al. eds. 1961).
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relationship between the human mind and the body, has proved
the view to be inconsistent with the needs of the present time.
At the present time, the United States courts have veered from
the original state of apprehension they were in and have recog-
nized mental distress as an injury, while setting standards of
proof to be complied with by the plaintiff in order that the de-
fendant be equally protected. This approach is both progressive
and reasonable, although an overt emphasis on the protection
of the defendant can easily act to the detriment of the plaintiff's
case.
The early view taken by the courts in the United States, that
mental injury is incapable of being visualized or proved, was the
result of the influence of English common law.25 Heavy reliance
was placed by the English courts in the tenth century on the fact
that mental injury was beyond the realm of human understand-
ing. Therefore, although not mentioned in specific language, it
is evident that the courts, acknowledging the futility of defining
mental distress as damage, attributed to the tortfeasor the same
quality of being unable to realize and foresee the distinct mental
injury that he could cause one who is injured by him. One can
only surmise that it had been considered logical that if the
courts could not identify mental distress as damage, neither
could the tortfeasor. Therefore, originally, as a tortfeasor could
not be expected to be conscious of the possibility of mental in-
jury which his victim might suffer, he would not be held liable
unless he actually intended the mental injury, or was conscious
that his act would result in causing the victim pain of mind that
would lead to an observable physical injury. The courts have
been concerned with two main problems whether physical in-
jury must necessarily follow mental injury and whether such
mental injury must be intentionally caused for it to be recog-
nized as damage. To both these questions, the answer had been
in the affirmative.
A. MENTAL INJURY INTENTIONALLY CAUSED
After the decision in Lynch v. Knight, the case of Wilkinson v.
Downton26 followed, introducing the principle in England that
the courts would recognize an act calculated to cause mental
injury which leads to consequent physical injury as a wrong.
25 The attitude is typified by the strong approach taken in Lynch v. Knight, 11
Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861).
26 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
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The words "calculated to" mean "likely to," which immediately
calls for the requirement that the tortfeasor be consciously
aware of the likelihood of mental injury to the injured. These
two cases were heavily relied upon in the United States. The
influence has been so significant that it has pervaded academic
opinion as well. Prosser, in 1937, defined the infliction of
mental distress as "the intentional, outrageous infliction of
mental suffering in an extreme form."27 A conspicuous feature
of the definition is the inclusion of the word "intentional." Does
this mean that mental distress unintentionally inflicted is no
damage at all in terms of a tort? The answer lies in the dictum
in the Wilkinson case itself, which recognizes as actionable dam-
age that is likely to be caused by the act of the tortfeasor. When
compared with the element of intention which implies delibera-
tion and a desire to cause a particular injury, the former is more
suited to the context of modern tort law.
A prominent aspect of the law of torts has been its adherence
to the principles of the common law in the award of damages.
For example, in cases of negligence, the courts, both in the
United States and in England, have not restricted the award of
damages to intentional injuries. It is certainly true that an act
deliberately intended to cause mental injury is much more hei-
nous than an unintentional infliction of mental distress. How-
ever, it does not necessarily follow that only intentional mental
injury should be recognized as a damage. Judicial and academic
reasoning in support of insisting on an intentional infliction of
mental injury has been based, so far, on the fact that the mind is
not easily observable, and an injury to it is not easily envisaged
by an injurer. Today, the mind and the body are considered a
composite system, connected to one another. An injury to the
mind is as apparent as an injury to the body, so that there is no
longer a need to insist on the element of intention to establish
the culpability of the tortfeasor. Therefore, a tortfeasor may be
held responsible for the damage caused to the mind of the in-
jured even though he did not actually intend to inflict mental
injury.
27 Intentional, supra note 15, at 874.
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B. ACADEMIC AND JUDICIAL OPINION ON MENTAL DISTRESS AS A
PHYSICAL INJURY
Although Prosser dealt only with the intentional infliction of
mental distress,2 he was quite emphatic that mental distress is
similar to physical damage. He stated that: "mental suffering
is... no less a real injury than 'physical pain' [and] it is ... the
business of the courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for
redress."29
One of the earliest in England to observe the significance of
mental distress as a positive injury was Judge Kennedy when he
said: "I should not be surprised if the surgeon or the physiolo-
gist told us that nervous shock is or may be in itself an injurious
affection of the physical organism."'0 This statement is an ac-
knowledgement that mental injury may lead directly to physical
injury which, though not externally visible, may be evident to a
trained medical mind. However, it is interesting to note that
such an opinion did not radically change the attitude of the
courts in this respect. The basic difficulty was that the conven-
tional view of tort liability could not be shaken. The commis-
sion of a tort had to be ascertainable externally. Judges, being
laymen from the medical point of view, have been consistently
hesitant to adjudicate upon anything which was not apparent or
proven on an empirical basis. While it is true that the effects of
mental injury could not be scientifically proven by way of a gen-
eral test, the overwhelming opinion of medical science should
have at least made the courts acknowledge the plausibility of
what was stated. This makes the judicial approach on this sub-
ject a trifle disconcerting.
Once the courts recognize that mental distress per se is an ac-
tionable wrong when inflicted, they can devise a viable basis for
determining who is entitled to damages. The guidelines for
awarding damages and the role played by the courts form the
substance of the last few chapters of this work. For the present,
it can be stated that by adopting a rigid attitude towards the
infliction of mental distress, the courts do not exhibit a full ap-
preciation of mental distress as an injury.
Failure to accord recognition to the infliction of mental dis-
tress as an actionable injury raises the interesting point of
whether it would constitute a violation of a fundamental human
28 See HANDBOOK, supra note 15 at 328-29.
Id. at 327-28.
so Dulieu v. White, 2 K.B. 669, 677 (1901).
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right in the context of American society. It cannot be doubted
that the fundamental rights of individuals in the United States
are the right of personal liberty and security, reputation, and
propertyA1 The invasion of any of these fundamental rights
constitutes a tort. It is fair to assume that no court will deny this
principle. If this be so, it seems clear that the infliction of pain
of mind under any circumstances, is an erosion of the right to
liberty and security. To establish, therefore, that mental distress
when inflicted upon a person can be regarded as a tort, the only
element needed seems to be to ascertain definitely that mental
distress ensured from a particular act. This should be done with
caution.
That a tort is a wrong committed against a person is undis-
puted. To what extent this definition can be applied is seen in
the statement that: "Particular torts, as trespasses of violence,
defamation, nuisance, and the like, can be defined well enough,
but the term 'tort' is also used to denote wrong in general. It
includes the unclassified residuum as well as specific definable
wrongs." 32
The infliction of mental distress falls into the "unclassified re-
siduum" and is certainly a wrong. Though not often, it has been
judicially recognized that mental distress is synonymous with a
state of anxiety caused by stress. Judge Stanford said, "'Mental
distress . . . includes sorrow and grief . . .' to which Judge
Rainey added humiliation, mortification, and shame as sensibili-
ties of the mind which show mental distress. 4 This view is seen
in one instance where a person subjected to a state of intense
worry was held to be suffering from mental distress.3 On the
one hand, it is evident that anxiety induced by stress in any form
is both an injury and an infringement of a right. On the other
hand, the courts definitely stand circumscribed, as they have not
been able to visualize the damage and assess it. It is a dichotomy
difficult to resolve. The only way out of this tangle is for the
courts to view mental injury as a definite injury on the following
lines.
31 Jeremiah Smith, Torts Without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1920-
21).
32 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY XXV-XXVi (1906).
33 Davis v. Hill, 291 S.W. 681, 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1927, writ granted).
34 See International & G.N.R. Co. v. Hood, 118 S.W. 1119, 1122 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




It is a common human feature to undergo a mental reaction
under stress. For instance, if a person is involved in an accident
directly or indirectly by witnessing the accident, the thought
process of that person would be far from pleasant. The
thoughts that run through his mind threaten his sense of secur-
ity. Therefore, a person who causes the accident commits a
wrong against anyone who is either directly involved or who wit-
nesses it and is shocked by what he sees. However, it does not
necessarily mean that liability attaches in respect of everyone in
the vicinity of the accident. A clear burden of proof should rest
on the plaintiff to show that he, in fact, suffered mental injury as
a result of an act of the defendant.
A gradual awakening to the problem which veered from the
initial attitude of regarding the infliction of mental distress
along the lines of the English common law, which rejected the
notion as being abstract and vague, was seen with the emer-
gence of American Realist thinking. It brought out new per-
spective to the concept of tort. This was done by acknowledging
that the dispensation of justice was dependent, if not fully, to
some extent at least on allied disciplines. Medical science, eco-
nomics, and technology were used to deduce facts which were
outside the purview of the law. In this light, mental distress
ceased to be vague. It was found that mental distress could be
assessed. The functions of Realism in the context of tort law
have been subsumed in the statements: "Realism, we have seen,
reflected an enhanced twentieth-century awareness of the psy-
chological dimensions of human behavior, an awareness that
was linked to a growing interest in the explanatory powers of the
behavioral sciences."36
The infliction of mental distress has been recognized by writ-
ers as an actionable wrong for a considerable period of time.
The emphasis so far has been on the intention of the person
who causes it. In fact, legal thinking has not been generally
used to associate the infliction of mental distress with an unin-
tentional act. This was due to regarding the human mind as
totally unrelated to the functions of the human body. A duty
not to upset the mental stability of a person to his detriment
does not seem to tie up with the duty of care not to injure one's
neighbor,37 the fundamental premise on which negligence is
based. As a result of this, the majority of jurisdictions in the
-6 WHITE, supra note 14, at 103.
37 See Donoghue v. Stevensen, 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.).
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United States have insisted that mental distress is parasitic and
should be the outcome of an intentional act causing visible phys-
ical injury. Yet, there are some jurisdictions which recognize the
infliction of mental distress per se as actionable. This has been
done with no uniformity; courts have digressed from one con-
cept to another, ranging from foreseeability in negligence38 to
the extreme measure of imposing strict liability.39 The profu-
sion of legal writing, which has dealt mostly with the principles
of negligence as applicable to the infliction of mental distress,
and the general policy laid down in most states to award dam-
ages in tort to the most deserving have left the courts even more
confounded. To inquire into this situation, the judicial trends
which evolved into the existing position must be traced.
IV. SOME JUDICIAL TRENDS INTHE TREATMENT OF
MENTAL DISTRESS
A. MENTAL DISTRESS INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED ACCOMPANIED
BY PHYSICAL INJURY
In the United States, mental distress has been the subject of
much litigation. The cases, most of which are similar in facts,
are innumerable. It seems both fruitless and difficult to analyse
each case in order to arrive at a general conclusion as to what
the law is on the subject. It is proposed in this paper to analyse
the case law selectively, on the basis of how important the cases
are in portraying the overall judicial attitude towards the
subject.
The recognition of the infliction of damage in the field of
torts evolved gradually. As mentioned earlier, the courts were
hesitant to identify mental distress as compensable and as an
isolated head of liability. Therefore, the common law recog-
nized mental distress as actionable only if intentionally inflicted
or if accompanied by physical impact. Generally, the assessment
was made by determining whether the two elements mentioned
above caused some observable physical injury to the plaintiff.
Most states in the United States relied heavily upon these crite-
ria as guidelines in the award of damages.
38 See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
39 See Shepard v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
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B. THE PHYSICAL IMPACT THEORY
Mental distress has been regarded in many states to be merely
the outcome of a physical injury which results from a physical
impact upon the human body. The insistence on recognizing
the actionability of mental distress if inflicted only as a result of
an actual physical impact on the plaintiff was so prominent that
it was known as the Physical Impact Theory. In legal parlance,
the states that adopt this theory are called impact states. The
theory itself is best illustrated by the case of Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric
Finishing Co.,40 decided in Arkansas in 1959. One of the plain-
tiffs brought an action against the driver of a tractor which
struck the plaintiffs vehicle. Consequently, the plaintiff's father
was crushed and killed when the trailer rolled back from a sta-
tionary position due to brake failure. The deceased was heard
to groan and cry out after the impact, which made the court
conclude that the distress caused to the deceased was more
mental than physical, though it lasted for a short duration. The
court awarded damages of $1,000 to be distributed among the
children of the deceased. ChiefJudge Henley, delivering judge-
ment, said that: "It is a well settled principle of Arkansas law that
no recovery can be had for negligently inflicted mental anguish,
fright, shock, or grief, unless the same is produced by a physical
injury, and that rule extends to physical symptoms resulting
from the emotional shock in question. 41
Chief Judge Henley cited other decisions where physical in-
jury was considered to be a natural precursor to mental injury.42
An exception is seen in cases involving the right of privacy,
where courts have, while recognizing the necessity of the impact
theory, deemed it fair to award damages for injury to the per-
sonality. 43 The law seems to recognize public humiliation to be
more of a mental injury than the infliction of death on a person.
Exfacie, the demarcation sounds ludicrous, as both humiliation
40 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
41 Id. at 697.
42 See id. (discussing Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 53 S.W. 673 (Ark.
1899)). For District of Columbia law, see Gilper v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 302
A.2d 740, 745 (D.D.C. 1973); Garber v. United States, 578 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). For Indiana law based on the same impact principle, see Leatherman
v. Gateway Transp. Co., 331 F.2d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1964); Berrier v. Beneficial
Fin., Inc., 234 F. Supp. 204, 205 (N.D. Ind. 1964).
43 See Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, 353 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Ark. 1962) (finding
that using a photograph of the plaintiff without permission gives rise to a cause of
action irrespective of physical injury or mala fides).
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and death can involve continuous mental suffering. It is time to
review this attitude and treat both equally, as torts involving the
human mind which cause acute discomfort. The ramifications
of the impact theory and the developments which followed will
be discussed later.
C. THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL DIsTREss
Some jurisdictions regard the infliction of mental distress as
parasitic or dependent upon the element of intention, in the
absence of physical impact. The dependence upon intention
has almost been taken for granted. In many states, the infliction
of mental anguish, pain of mind and apprehension are still
heavily burdened with the necessity of being accompanied by an
intentional act on the part of the defendant. In Connecticut, it
has been recognized "that a cause of action in tort may be cre-
ated for a plaintiffs emotional distress which is the foreseeable
and proximate result of the defendant's intentional, wanton, or
wilful wrongful conduct.""
It is clear in this instance that the court meant that emotional
distress caused to a person is damage recognizable in tort if the
defendant could foresee the possible infliction of mental dis-
tress that could be caused by his intentional wrongful conduct.
The act itself, though intentionally caused, need not be per-
formed with the specific intention of causing mental distress to
the victim.
In Florida, which shows consistent litigation on the subject of
the infliction of mental distress, the law is in sharp contrast to
the broad rationale mentioned above. There is no single in-
stance of the infliction of pain of mind being regarded as in-
dependent of intention.45 The most recent pronouncement
comes from Steiner & Munach, P.A. v. Williams,a6 decided in
1976, which decided that the law in Florida still remains that
there is no recovery for mental or emotional injuries unless
44 United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Glens Fall Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869, 872 (D.
Conn. 1972).
45 See Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (recogniz-
ing that recovery may be had for intentionally inflicted mental injury without
physical impact). In Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551, 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965), the court held that malice and mental distress are complementary factors.
See alsoJackson v. Rupp, 228 So. 2d 916, 918-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Elling-
ton v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 1165, 1167 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (implying that for
an action in mental distress to be sustained, there has to be both physical impact
resulting in a physical injury, and the element of intention).
46 334 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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there are other factors present. These factors can be either a
physical impact or such injuries produced as a result of a delib-
erate and calculated act performed with the intention of pro-
ducing such an injury by one who knows that his act would in
fact cause injury.47 This insistence on intention as a requisite for
the award of damages for mental distress is seen in Maryland,48
Kansas,49 and South Carolina. 0 There is almost an implied rec-
ognition that mental security or stability need not be taken into
account by a reasonable man as a protected right of an individ-
ual. Most states have followed the rule that for the infliction of
mental distress to be recognized as a damage, it has to be the
outcome of physical injury caused by physical impact, or it has to
be the result of an intentional act by the defendant. This atti-
tude can be observed in Massachusetts5 1 as well as in Penn-
sylvania 5 2 Ohio,5  New Jersey, 4  Minnesota 5 Mississippi,56
Missouri,57 Michigan,58 Washington,59 Virginia" and Texas.61
47 See id. at 42.
- See Zeigler v. F. Street Corp., 235 A.2d 703, 705 (Md. 1967).
- See Dawson v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 529 P.2d 104, 112
(Kan. 1974).
50 See Whitten v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 468 F. Supp. 470, 473 (D.S.C.
1977).
51 See In re United States, 418 F.2d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1969); Cohen v. Lion
Prod. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D. Mass. 1959); Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons,
168 N.E.2d. 80, 84 (Mass. 1960).
52 See Becker v. Borough of Schylkill Haven, 189 A.2d 764, 767 (Pa. 1963).
53 See Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 172 N.E.2d 734, 735 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961); Heid
v. Red Malcuit, Inc., 12 Ohio Misc. 158 (1967).
54 See Greenberg v. Stanley, 143 A.2d 588, 597 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958),
affld in part, revd in part, 153 A.2d 833 (N.J. 1959).
55 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 122 N.W.2d 36 (Minn.
1963).
56 See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 354 F. Supp. 645, 648 (N.D. Miss. 1973);
Aldridge v. Johnson, 318 So. 2d 870, 873 (Miss. 1975) (stating that although the
court would not insist on physical injury, the injury must be capable of assess-
ment); Lyons v. Zale Jewelery Co., 150 So. 2d 154, 162 (Miss. 1963); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 736 So. 2d 384 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
57 See Francisco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 1966);
Langworthy v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 368 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Mo. 1963); Gambill v.
White, 303 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Mo. 1957); Smith v. Aldridge, 356 S.W.2d 532, 537
(Mo. Ct. App. 1962).
58 See Maine v. Matson Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co., 148 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Mich.
1967); Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 143 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1966).
59 See Browning v. Slenderella Sys. of Seattle, 341 P.2d 859, 863 (Wash. 1959).
60 See Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974). The four elements
were required to satisfy the requirement to award damages for mental distress
without physical injury. They were an intentional and reckless act, outrageous
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The heavy reliance placed on the element of intention is due to
the fact that the courts do not regard mental distress as an injury
for which a tortfeasor could be held liable unless he desires such
injury to be inflicted on the injured.
A far less stringent criterion is observed in Nebraska, which
recognizes that physical injury is not an essential prerequisite for
awarding damages for the infliction of mental distress, if mental
injury is a reasonably certain result of the act of the tortfeasor.
There are some states which rely so much on the element of
intention that they have recognized the infliction of mental dis-
tress to be solely dependent on whether the defendant's act was
intended to cause mental injury to the plaintiff. New Jersey has
gone a step further in saying that the only factor necessary is the
defendant's conduct when he inflicted the injury on the plain-
tiff.62 Undeniably, in this case the courts would inquire whether
the defendant's conduct shows a disregard for the possible
mental pain that could be caused to the plaintiff by the defend-
ant's act.
One conspicuous feature which stands out in the above in-
stances is that much is left to judicial discretion. To elaborate
further, while all jurisdictions have stated that mental distress
has to be accompanied either by physical injury or by an inten-
tional act on the part of the defendant, the methods adopted
and the criteria laid down to determine whether mental distress
can result from particular circumstances have differed. This is
especially so in the case of intention. While some courts have
laid down requirements to determine the nature of the act,
others have determined the existence or non existence of an
conduct on the part of the defendant, a causal connection between the act and
the pain of mind caused, and severe emotional distress.
61 See Houston-American Fin. Corp. v. Travis, 343 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1960, reh'g denied); Stafford v. Steward, 295 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, reh'g denied); Fisher v. Carousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,
414 S.W.2d. 774, 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, reh'g denied); Pat H. Foley &
Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969, reh'g denied);
Ledisco Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1976, no writ).
62 See Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc. 265 A.2d 404, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1970). One can contrast this attitude with that of Virginia and West Virginia law,
which insists on an intentional infliction of mental distress. See also Perlin v.
Chappell, 96 S.E.2d 805, 810 (Va. 1957); Sprouse v. Clay Communications, 211
S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975); Williams v. Penn. Line Serv. Inc., 126 S.E.2d 384, 384
(W. Va. 1962). For the same approach in Missouri, see Warren v. Parrish, 436
S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. 1969).
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intentional act without laying down specific guidelines for doing
so. This is an interesting feature which warrants discussion.
Determining the conduct of the plaintiff has been ap-
proached in two different ways. The first is both stringent and
direct. An example of the first category is Iowa, which has cate-
gorically stated that the element required is a willful act which is
carried out against the plaintiff. This approach was first seen in
1932 in the case of Barnett v. Collection Service Co.63 It concerned
the claim of an elderly widow who had been repeatedly sent let-
ters of demand by a coal company for $28.75, which she owed
them. She claimed that she suffered mental distress as a result
of the letters. There was no evidence of physical injury
whatever. The court held that an action would lie for the inflic-
tion of mental distress on the plaintiff, as she was the subject of a
willful act committed by the defendant company.64 Almost the
same terminology was followed in 1967, where a court decided
that mental distress is recognized only if it is inflicted in the
course of a willful act on the part of the defendants. 65 The
courts do not definitely say whether by a willful act they mean an
act committed willfully with a desire to cause mental distress in
particular, or whether the act alone has to be deliberate with no
specific intent to cause mental injury. Academic opinion favors
the view that it should be a willful act with desire to cause
mental distress.66
The second is where the requirement of intention has yielded
to the element of foresight. In Oklahoma, the element required
is neither a willful act nor intention to cause mental injury, but
mere foreseability. This obviates the insistence on volition on
the part of the defendant. In pursuance of this policy, an
Oklahoma court held that an action could be successfully
grounded against a defendant whose act had inflicted traumatic
neurosis on the plaintiff, if the circumstances enabled the de-
fendant to have reasonable foresight of the result of his act.67
63 242 N.W. 25 (Iowa 1932).
- See id. at 28.
65 See Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 426 (N.D. Iowa 1967).
6 See Comment, The Theoy and Application of Punitive Damages in Iowa, 7 DRAKE
L. REv. 36, 53 (1957); Note, 18 IowA L. REv. 366 at 370-71 (1952).
67 See Buckner v. FreightLiner Corp., 403 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
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V. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF MENTAL DISTRESS
AS DAMAGE
Generally, mental distress is inflicted as a result of an acci-
dent. It may be caused as a result of the negligence of the per-
sons involved in the accident, or even by a third party who is not
physically present at the accident. For example, an accident
may be caused by a defective product which fails to function
properly. In that case it may be entirely the fault of the manu-
facturer. The attitude of the courts has thus far been either to
insist on a physical impact on the plaintiff, or an intentional act
on the part of the defendant. In both cases observable physical
symptoms were the basis of the courts assessment of the mental
injury. In this sense the infliction of mental distress has always
been dependent on one of the two accompanying factors men-
tioned above.
This attitude prevailed as late as 1958.68 In Ohio, where a
court rejected a claim for damages for emotional distress and
embarrassment caused by threats, Justice Stewart citing prece-
dent69 observed: "'the damages sought to be recovered are too
remote and speculative. The injury is more sentimental than
substantial. Being easily simulated and hard to disprove, there is
no standard by which it can be justly, or even approximately,
compensated.' "70
This total rejection of mental distress unaccompanied by any
other element was largely due to heavy reliance being placed on
the accepted view that "mental suffering and its consequences
are so evanescent and intangible that they cannot be foreseen or
anticipated and for that reason have no reasonable proximate
causal connection with the act of the defendant."71
The view that mental distress, to be recognized as inflicted on
a person tortiously has to be fortified by other elements, has led
to uncertainty in Florida. In 1972, a court pronounced on a
general basis that in the area of tort, the infliction of mental
distress is compensable. Two years later, in a suit brought by a
person against the manufacturer of an airplane, for mental suf-
fering caused to his wife as a result of an accident, the court
68 See Parmalee v. Ackerman, 252 F.2d 721, 722 (6th Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
69 See Grill v. Abele Funeral Home, Inc., 42 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940);
Reed v. Ford, 112 S.W. 600, 601 (Ky. 1908).
7o Bartow v. Smith, 78 N.E. 2d 735, 740 (Ohio 1948) (quoting Reed v. Ford,
112 S.W. 600, 601 (Ky. 1908)) overruled by Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters,
453 N.E. 2d 666 (Ohio 1983).
71 Bartow, 78 N.E.2d at 740 (Hart, J., dissenting).
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held that the infliction of mental pain and anguish, in the ab-
sence of physical impact, could not be recognized.7 2 This makes
Florida fall into the category of an impact state. In the 1972
case, Judge Mager stated that if mental distress was the outcome
of a tort committed against a person, it was compensable. v3
There was no further expansion of explanation. If one were to
accept the view that a tort is a civil wrong against a person which
is not contractual as stated earlier, the statement ofJudge Mager
would mean that if mental distress is inflicted as a result of a
breach of duty which one owed to another it is compensable.
All that the plaintiff need show is that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care which was breached, as a result of which
the plaintiff suffered damage. The only difficulty lies in deter-
mining what damage is. To Florida and the other impact states
it should be the outcome of an actual physical impact on the
plaintiff. In other words, the damage should be perceptible to
the senses and be caused by a physical impact alone. The essen-
tial weakness of the impact theory is that its proponents consid-
ered the infliction of mental injury to be actionable only if it
showed its ill effects after being caused by a physical impact on
the body of the victim. There arises cause for the criticism that
the theory does not envisage that mental injury can be caused by
hearing or by seeing something unpleasant. In the modern con-
text, a person who witnesses an accident caused by a defective
product such as faulty aircraft or who hears a loud sound which
a defective product causes and suffers mental distress as a conse-
quence, would not have any remedy against the person responsi-
ble for the product. The main reason for the narrow outlook
taken by the impact theory is that no consideration has been
given to the real nature of mental distress and how differently it
can be caused.
VI. THE INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS AS AN
INDEPENDENT HEAD OF DAMAGE
The component states of the United States are divided on the
question of the status of mental distress per se. Mental distress
per se means mental distress independent of observable physical
injury caused by either physical impact upon the plaintiff or an
intentional act on the part of the defendant. Generally, it can
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be said that most states still adhere to the traditional common
law approach of requiring one or the other. The states which
have deviated from this trend, though few in number, have been
more specific in asserting the recognition of the infliction of
mental distress as an independent tort.
Illinois is an example of a state which, though an adherent to
the common law principle that physical injury is essential for the
award of damages, has digressed radically to change its law. In
Bushers v. Graceland Cemetary Association of Albion Illinois,"4 in
which the plaintiff claimed infliction of mental distress, this ap-
proach was clear. The plaintiffs objected to oil drilling in a cem-
etery in which a relative of theirs was buried. Chief Judge Platt
stated that there was a recognized breaking away from the gen-
eral rule on this point.75 His honor cited a previous decision
where it was stated that "[t]he common law, it is said, grants
recoveries only for injuries either to the person or the purse and
not for mere mental suffering. This reasoning no longer accu-
rately portrays the state of the law. ' '76
This brought the court to the conclusion that the trend in the
United States was to give increasing protection to the interests
of freedom from emotional distress. The same line of judicial
thinking is observed in Maine, where the overriding considera-
tion has been for the recognition of the freedom from mental
assault. In Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc.78 where the
plaintiff brought an action against a soft drink bottler for inju-
ries caused to him when he drank from a bottle containing a
prophylactic, the court discounted a previous decision 79 which
held that bodily injury was essential to an action in mental dis-
tress. The decision in the Wallace case was heavily influenced by
the advancement made by medical science in this area. Judge
Pomeroy summed up by saying that mental damage, to be ac-
tionable, "must be substantial and manifested by objective symp-
tomatology."' By this is meant that the courts have every right
to assess the circumstances of a case and conclude whether
74 171 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
75 See id. at 212.
76 Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952).
77 See id. at 746.
78 269 A.2d. 117 (Me. 1970), overruled by Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets,
Inc., 443 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
79 See id. at 120 (citing Herrick v. Evening Pub Co., 113 A. 16 (Me. 1921),
overruled by Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc.,269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970),
modified, 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987)).
80 Id. at 121.
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mental distress has been inflicted on a plaintiff or not. This de-
cision was later cited with approval by Chief Justice McKusick in
Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,8 1 stating that any person merits
protection from even an unintentional act which produces
mental distress.82
Medical science has done much to present the notion of
mental distress in a new perspective. This is one reason why
some jurisdictions recognize mental distress even though it is
caused independently of physical impact. The statement of Pre-
siding Judge Crumpacker, in 1956, illustrates the subtlety that
"mental anguish for which recovery may be had in an action for
personal injuries is something more than the mental sensation
of pain resulting from physical injuries. "83
The same criterion has been followed rigidly in Kansas, which
has accepted the view that neither physical injury nor an inten-
tional act is necessary to award damages for inflicted mental dis-
tress.8 4 The policy behind such reasoning is that mental distress
is no longer an unidentifiable concept, but a definite, independ-
ent wrong when inflicted on a person.
Louisiana is yet another jurisdiction which has been emphatic
about the recognition of the infliction of mental distress as an
independent head of compensation. In Gremillion v. C & L Con-
struction Co., Inc.,s" the court positively stated that the infliction
of mental distress warrants damages. The plaintiff suffered
shock when heavy equipment owned by the defendant and in-
sured by the co defendant ran out of control and crashed into
the plaintiff's truck. Judge Hood observed that " [i] n Louisiana
damages for mental anguish and shock, resulting from trespass
or damage to property, are considered as actual damages and as
such are compensatory."8 6
His honor cited the case of McGee v. Yazoo & M.VR. Co.,
8 7
which expressed the same principle more elaborately. The
court in the McGee case said:
we see no reason why damages for mental anguish or suffering
cannot be recovered in addition to property damage. Mental
81 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979).
82 See id. at 154.
83 New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Henderson, 137 N.E.2d 744, 746
(Ind. App. 1956).
84 Monroe v. Darr, 559 P.2d 322, 327 (Kan. 1977).
85 125 So. 2d 198 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
86 Id. at 201.
87 19 So. 2d 21 (La. 1944).
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anguish or suffering is a distinct element of damages and is not
merely an incident to be taken into consideration in addition to
a pecuniary loss suffered by reason of a wrongful or negligent
injury to persons and property.88
This gradually evolved into the recognition that the concept
of mental distress as an independent head of damage is an inte-
gral part of contemporary jurisprudence in Louisiana.89 Once
the infliction of mental distress is established by circumstance,
the courts award damages without going into whether there was
an intentional act of the defendant, or whether there was a phys-
ical impact on the plaintiff.
In the state of New York, the rule set out in Michel v. Rochester
Railway Co.,9" that mental anguish caused by the fault of a per-
son is not actionable against him in the absence of contempora-
neous physical impact, has since been abrogated.9 In Battalla v.
State, the court held that a nine year old girl could recover for
psychic injury caused to her by the act of an operator of a chair
lift who failed to fasten the safety bar in the chair.9 2 However,
this reasoning has been cautiously applied so as not to apply on
an overtly general basis. This is because of an apprehension
that it would prima facie act to the detriment of the defendant.
The courts in New York have insisted on stringent evidence of
mental suffering before a claim for damages can be allowed.
Conceptually it has been recognized that mental injury without
attendant physical injury is allowable as a head of damage.9
However, the courts have stated the general law to be based on
the criterion of whether the act was intentional or not.94 How-
ever, in the Battalla case, neither of these elements is men-
tioned, as the court decided to award damages in the
circumstances of the case. It is envisaged that in New York a
decision would largely depend on the facts of a case. Where the
negligence is gross and the injury caused is considerable, the
courts would have no hesitation in making an exception as in
the Battalla case.
88 Id. at 24; see also Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80 So. 2d 845, 850
(La. 1955).
89 See American Steel Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Brezner, 158 So. 2d 623,631 (La. Ct.
App. 1963); see also Nickens v. C.A. McGehee, 184 So. 2d 271, 278 (La. Ct. App.
1966).
90 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896).
91 See id. at 355.
92 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. 1961).
93 See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1958).
94 See Cauverien v. De Metz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
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Under Montana law, the courts have taken a different ap-
proach. The application of the law itself is liberal. Montana rec-
ognizes any detriment caused by a person as a compensable
injury. Pursuant to this principle, the courts on two occasions
have recognized an independent cause of action for mental in-
jury inflicted.95 The identical judicial policy is seen in the appli-
cation of the law in Michigan where courts have unreservedly
accepted the infliction of mental distress as an independent
tort. Stewart v. Rudne 96 was a case where the parents of a still-
born child suffered pain of mind as a result of the failure on the
part of the surgeon to perform a cesarian operation on the
mother. The mother sued the surgeon for failure to perform
his contractual obligations. The court held that recovery for
mental disturbance is actionable both in contract and in tort.97
Justice Smith said:
Although the law in this field is in a state of marked transition
and fluidity, it is not too early to state that there is a marked
trend towards recovery .... We have come to realize, slowly, it is
true that the law protects interests of personality, as well as physi-
cal integrity of the person, and that emotional damage is just as
real (and as compensable as) physical damage.9"
In Iowa and Colorado, the infliction of mental distress is in
limine considered a viable, separate cause of action, provided
there exists a causal nexus between the act and the resulting
injury.99 However, the interesting feature in these two jurisdic-
tions is that while the infliction of mental distress is accorded
considerable independence from other wrongs, the courts have
approached the subject by taking into consideration the circum-
stances and the seriousness of a case. Courts have been em-
phatic about the need for a definite connection between the act
of the defendant and the injury caused. In this respect, the law
in these two states is not dissimilar to that in New York, which
was discussed earlier. The discretion exercised by the courts in
assessing the infliction of mental distress in relation to the act of
95 See Wilson v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 166 F. Supp. 667, 675 (D. Mont.
1958).
96 84 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1957).
97 See id. at 826.
98 Id. at 822; seeJankowski v. Mazzotta, 152 N.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Mich. Ct. App.
1967).
- See Northrup v. Miles Homes Inc. of Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 850, 860 (Iowa 1973);
see also Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D. Colo. 1965); Towns v.
Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Colo. 1978).
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the defendant is so wide that in Meiter v. Cavanaugh' decided
in Colorado in 1978, in which the purchaser of a house sued the
vendor for not vacating the house and indulging in outrageous
conduct, the court awarded damages to a plaintiff for mental
distress caused by the action of the defendant without laying
down the criteria it followed. 01
The history of the notion of mental distress has undergone a
steady evolution in California. The prominent feature in this
jurisdiction is that the case law seems to have been decided on
the initial premise that mental distress is an independent injury.
It has been differentiated from physical injury as being self-exis-
tent and sui generis.10 2 In United States v. Hatahley° 3 Circuit
Judge Pickett stated the view that one could recognize mental
distress as an independent injury if it is the result of extreme
circumstances of the defendant's behavior." 4 However, a divi-
sion of opinion exists in some instances where the courts have
stated that the infliction of mental distress is not in itself a tort,
but a form of injury resulting from tortious conduct.0 5 There is
yet another view which says that mental distress must be severe
and must result in physical injury to be compensated. 0 6 This
reflects the Californian attitude that while mental distress is con-
sidered to exist independently, the courts have been circum-
spect about awarding compensation due to the absence of a
precise definition of the phrase "mental distress." Much is left
to the discretion of the courts to award damages. This is due to
two factors. The first is that the courts, in assessing mental dis-
tress, have not embarked upon a serious study of the notion of
mental distress from a psychological standpoint. If this was
100 580 P.2d 399 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
101 See id. at 401-02.
102 See Altman v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 148 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978).
103 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958).
104 See id. at 925. Extreme circumstances have been interpreted to mean de-
fendant's outrageous conduct. See Perati v. Atkinson, 28 Cal. Rptr. 898, 899 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1963). In Leavy v. Cooney, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963),
Presiding Justice Shinn said that extreme circumstances would mean the defend-
ant's wrongful and intentional conduct. Spackman v. Good, 54 Cal. Rptr. 78, 84
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966), held the same as the Leavy case on this point. In Mack v.
Hugh W Constock Assocs., Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 466, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964), the
court held that wantonness and malice on the part of the defendant constituted
extreme circumstances.
105 See Gautier v. General Tel. Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 404, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).




done, arriving at a conclusion in each case would have been
much easier. The second is that the courts have always regarded
the measure of damages to be altogether incapable of being as-
sessed. The result of this attitude brought about a great deal of
diversity within the courts.
The 1967 case of Vanoni v. Western Airlines10 7 demonstrates a
new approach to the treatment of mental distress. In an in-
stance in which some passengers of a flight operated by Western
Airlines sued for nervous disorders experienced by them due to
the negligent landing of the aircraft, Judge Elkington took a
more liberal view:
The real question ... is whether the subsequent nervous distur-
bance of the plaintiff was a suffering of the body or of the mind.
The interdependence of the mind and the body are in many re-
spects so close that it is impossible to distinguish their respective
influence upon each other .... It is a matter of general knowl-
edge that an attack of sudden fright, or an exposure to imminent
peril, has produced in individuals a complete change in their
nervous system, and rendered one who was physically strong and
vigorous, weak and timid. Such a result must be regarded as an
injury to the body rather than to the mind .... Whatever may be
the influence by which the nervous system is affected, its action
under that influence is entirely distinct from the mental process
which is set in motion by the brain. The nerves and the nerve
centers of the body are a part of the physical system, and are not
only susceptible of lesion from external causes, but are also liable
to be weakened and destroyed from causes primarily acting upon
the mind. If these nerves, or the entire nervous system, is thus
affected, there is a physical injury thereby produced; and, if the
primal cause of this injury is tortious, it is immaterial whether it is
direct... or indirect, through some action upon the mind.108
This judgment, unlike the others previously delivered, was ap-
parently formed without regarding mental distress as an un-
known quantity, coupled with a more liberal view of the bio-
physical interpretation of the concept. In addition, the court
took the view that the causal connection between the act of the
defendant and the injury suffered by the plaintiff may be estab-
lished either directly or indirectly through the mind. The basis
of the decision was that if the initial act of the defendant is tor-
tious, in that it amounts to a breach of a duty of care owed to the
107 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
108 Id. at 117 (quoting Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 44 P. 320, 322 (Cal.
1896)).
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plaintiff, it matters not whether the mental injury that follows
occurs directly or indirectly through some reaction upon the
mind. This decision has shed an entirely new light on the no-
tion of mental distress as it has been judicially recognized by the
common law. It is not disputed that stringent standards have to
be set in measuring the physical harm done to a person in as-
sessing the mental injury suffered. However, it must be acknowl-
edged that a basic recognition of the damage done to the
human being in terms of Judge Elkington's evaluation would
raise the concept of mental distress from the quagmire of dor-
mancy it has been placed in by the courts.
VII. SOME DEFINITE TRENDS TOWARD THE
RECOGNITION OF THE INFLICTION OF MENTAL
DISTRESS AS AN INDEPENDENT THEORY
OF LIABILITY
There are a few states previously cited that show unequivocally
that the infliction of mental distress is purely an independent
head of liability. These states have recognized that the common
law subscribes to this view. In order to examine their attitude in
more detail, a broader discussion is warranted.
Perhaps the most enlightening view in favor of treating the
infliction of mental distress per se as a separate theory of liability
is the line of judicial authority in Louisiana. A clear view that
mental distress need not in any way be accompanied by any
other factor to be considered eligible for redress prevails over all
other considerations.' ° Its independence as a separate entity is
well illustrated by Judge Lottinger in Trahan v. Perkins,110 where
his honor stated:
It is well established in our jurisprudence that a tort which gives
rise to mental anguish or emotional upset or other mental suffer-
ing on the part of the injured party creates a claim for damages
109 See Clegg v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1959); see
also Sahuc v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 320 F.2d 18, 20 (5th Cir. 1963)
("It has long been the law in Louisiana that recovery may be had for fright or
nervous shock unaccompanied by physical injury evidence by objective symp-
toms."). Six other cases upheld the same point. See Stewart v. Arkansas S. Ry.
Co., 36 So. 676, 677-78 (La. 1904); Klein v. Medical Bldg. Realty Co., 147 So. 122,
125-26 (La. Ct. App. 1933); Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145,
157 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Ford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 139 So. 2d 798,
800 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Taylor v. AllState Ins. Co., 205 So. 2d 807, 811 (La. Ct.
App. 1968); Booty v. American Fin. Corp. of Shreveport, 224 So. 2d 512, 515 (La.
Ct. App. 1969).
110 197 So. 2d 96 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
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which is separate and distinct from any claim for physical pain or
suffering resulting from physical injury.111
This statement unquestionably demonstrates that the estab-
lished law in Louisiana favors the independence of the infliction
of mental distress as a tort.
Oregon also has recognized the viability of the infliction of
mental distress as a separate theory of liability. In Hovis v. City of
Burns,'12 in which a widow brought an action against a city coun-
cil which had disinterred the remains of her husband, Judge
Holman said that the infliction of mental distress was definitely
an invasion of a legal right, and therefore a wrongful act. He
concluded that no physical injury or other factor is necessary to
award damages.11 3 An encouraging factor in these two jurisdic-
tions is that the courts are not unmindful of the risk of falling
into difficulty if this view is practiced without reservation. To
counter the problem, the courts have, while recognizing the ne-
cessity of giving significance to the mental element in human
beings, exercised the maximum caution. The courts have done
this by considering two factors-tracing liability to the defend-
ant and assessing the measure of damages. With regard to the
former, the requirement has been that a definite nexus be estab-
lished between the plaintiff and the defendant in order that it
be clearly shown that the defendant caused injury to the
plaintiff. 1 4
After much uncertainty, the law in New York seems to favor
the broad view accepted by both Louisiana and Oregon. Unlike
most other states, the case law in New York has evolved steadily.
New York rejected the original requirement of physical injury in
the view that the infliction of mental distress is independently
compensable. This has been dealt with earlier. The principle
enunciated by this view is that there is recovery for pain of mind
arising out of a breach of a duty of care owed to the plaintiff by
the defendant. There is much authority on the point of treating
the concept of freedom from mental distress as a legal right,
based on the view that there need not be physical impact or an
observable physical injury.' 15 The infliction of mental distress
111 Id. at 99.
112 415 P.2d 29 (Or. 1966).
113 See id. at 31; see also Senn v. Bunick, 594 P.2d 837, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
114 See Chriss v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 308 So. 2d 803, 805 (La. Ct.
App. 1975).
15 See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Varig Airlines,
S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 380 N.Y.S.2d 450, 459 (N.Y. Civ.
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can result directly from a negligent act which is accompanied by
foresight on the part of the defendant. A conspicuous feature
in New York, as compared with Louisiana, is that although both
recognize mental distress as a separate injury eligible for re-
dress, it is difficult to ascertain the policy of the former state
from the cases at hand. The reason is that the New York courts
have dealt with cases where the circumstances clearly establish
prima facie liability on the defendant. In Lula v. Sivaco Wire &
Nail Co., 11 6 judge van Pelt Bryan stated that although New York
has recognized this concept independent of other factors, little
has been said on the subject.1 17 The most recent decision is the
case of Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hospital Inc.," 8 decided in
1979. The owner of a pet poodle, who had paid for an elaborate
funeral for her pet, opened the casket in which the poodle's
remains were to be and found a dead cat inside. She sued the
funeral director alleging, inter alia, mental distress. Judge Fried-
man considered the element of mental distress per se and
awarded damages." 9 This decision was based on the fundamen-
tal principle enunciated in Battalla v. State,121 that mental dis-
tress could be recognized alone if it was the outcome of a
negligent act by the defendant.
If an assessment is to be made on the number ofjurisdictions
that do not consider the infliction of mental distress as in-
dependent against those which regard the existence of the con-
cept separately, it could be said that in the United States, still,
there are more states that regard mental distress as parasitic.
Even among the jurisdictions which have shown a liberal atti-
tude, apart from Louisiana and Illinois, the law is uncertain and
only partially developed. Apart from this, there is an over-
whelming majority ofjurisdictions, the attitudes of which are to-
tally repugnant to the sustenance of the infliction of mental
distress as a separate area of compensable injury. The inexora-
ble conclusion that can be arrived at from these factors is that
this area of law in the United States has still not expanded to
accommodate the notion of pain of mind fully. However, the
Ct. 1975); Brown v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 185 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1959); Halio v. Lurie, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961); Grimm v.
Barn, 195 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959).
116 265 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
117 See id. at 225.
118 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).
119 See id. at 183.
120 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961).
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vehement minority has broken all barriers. Perhaps the most
liberal view so far has been taken in a Tennessee case, in which
the court required both outrageous conduct of the defendant
and serious mental injury to the plaintiff. Chief Judge Burnett
said:
Memory and empathy tell us that the "hurt" perceived through
sensory media other than that of touch may be just as painful if
not more so than the "hurt" perceived by the tactile sense. More-
over, physicians tell us that the consequences of invasions of the
person accomplished through the perceptory media of sight and
sound may be as damaging, if not more damaging than invasions
of the person accomplished through the sense of touch.12 1
A prominent feature in the minority view is that although it
recognizes mental distress as independent and compensable,
the courts have considered the gravity of the injury, showing a
sensible balance of equities, as it would be dangerous to award
damages for the mere reason that mental distress is inflicted on
a person. For the present, the most encouraging thought is that
at least a few states have recognized the nature of mental dis-
tress. Once this is done, establishing criteria to protect against
arbitrary actions should not be difficult.
VIII. EMOTIONAL INJURY UNDER THE WARSAW SYSTEM
OF LIABILITY
It is incontrovertible that in a discussion of whether mental
injury is a "wounding" or "bodily injury" as reflected in the War-
saw Convention, a "personal injury," as referred to in the Guate-
mala City Protocol, 122 or a fortiori "lesion corporelle" as
appearing in the French text of the Convention, its nature has
to be both medically and forensically determined in order that
the concept of mental distress be assigned its place in the Con-
vention. No judge could presume to comprehend the nature of
mental injury in all its pathological and medical connotations-
a necessity if a juridical basis for mental injury were to be deter-
mined under the Warsaw system.
Medical jurisprudence is greatly assisted by the pioneering re-
search of Sigmund Freud who first analyzed mental injury and
121 Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 398 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Tenn. 1966).
122 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929
as amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, March 8,
1971, DEPT. ST. BULL., Apr. 21, 1971, at 555-59 [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol].
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traced its origins to a combination of fear and anxiety that
caused physical changes in the human body.123 It is now well
established from a medical standpoint (if not from a medical
jurisprudence standpoint) that fear and anxiety cause "unpleas-
ant subjective feelings of terror, a pounding heart, muscular
tenseness, exaggerated startle, dryness at the throat and mouth,
a sinking feeling in the stomach, nausea, perspiration, and urge
to urinate and maybe to defecate . ..difficulty in breathing,
etc."1
24
Forensically speaking, the terms bodily injury, wounding and
lesion corporelle have been obfuscated by the preconceived ju-
ridical notion that there is a strict difference between mental
and bodily injury. The confusion seems to have been worsened
by the interpretation of the French text of lesion corporelle as
strictly bodily injury (which indeed it may well be), and there-
fore the erroneous basis of the two being mutually exclusive had
prevailed in some instances. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.125 is one such case where the court held that the French
123 See generally 20 SIGMUND FREUD, Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, in THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD
75 (James Starchey et al eds., 1959). Sigmund Freud identified herein that while
fear per se was identified as neurotic anxiety, a combination of fear with anxiety
produced mental injury, which he said was the result of unrecognized internal
sources of threat that produced adverse physical changes in the human body. See
generally Carroll E. Izard & Silvan S. Tomkins, Affect and Behavior: Anxiety as a
Negative Affect, in ANXIETY AND BEHAVIOR 81, 99-123 (Charles D. Spielberger ed.,
1966) (explaining the relationship between anxiety and fear-terror); Richard S.
Lazarus & James R. Averill, Emotion and Cognition: With Special Reference to Anxiety,
in 2 ANXIETY:. CURRENT TRENDS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 241, 263-67 (Charles D.
Spielberger ed., 1972) (examining fear and anxiety as a unitary phenomenon);
ROLLO MAY, THE MEANING OF ANXIETY 53-57 (1950) (explaining the biological
relationship between anxiety and fear); Roy R. Grinker, The Physiology of Emotions,
in THE PHYSIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS: REPORT OF THE THIRD ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF
THE KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO 3,
15-16 (Alexander Simon et al eds., 1961) (examining differences between anxiety
and fear); HELEN FLANDERS DUNBAR, EMOTIONS AND BODILY CHANGES 685 (4th ed.
1954).
124 MARKS, supra note 18. The experience of fear and anxiety is known to cause
a person to "bend quickly, jerk his head forward, and blink his eyes." MAY, supra
note 123, at 46. The Psychosomatic Journal of the American Medical Association, in
1947 at page 1527, recorded that half the cases of acute illnesses and recovery
problems are attributable to the mental state of the patient. Anxiety is also
known to bring about an imbalance in the digestive process. See CANNON, supra
note 21, at 253-54. In his book The Wisdom of the Human Body, Cannon states that
mental distress would increase blood sugar levels of a subject bringing an un-
pleasant experience. See CANNON, supra note 23, at 276.
125 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
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version of the Convention should prevail, and therefore only a
bodily injury (and not mental injury) must be considered as
compensable. Although the case of Rosman v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.126 later rejected this view that the French text prevails
as the primal document, its ultimate decision was that mental
injury per se was not compensable under Article 17 of the Con-
vention. The courts in this line of cases seem to have adopted
the archaic views of Lynch v. Knight 27 without consulting the
prevalent findings of forensic medicine. A second line of think-
ing emerged in the case of Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.128
where the court held that mental injury was included in bodily
injury, claiming that the words "bodily injury" in the Convention
really covered mental injury. Here again, the court refused to
identify a medical similarity between the two terms but rather
went on to read the words "mental injury" into the Conven-
tion.129 Miller concludes that if a court adopts the line of think-
ing in the Husserl and Karfunkel decisions, a plaintiff would
recover for mental distress, while if the Rosman decision were to
be followed, no award of damages would ensue.
The operative point here is not whether the French text
prevails over the English translation of the Convention. Nor is
it, for that matter, which of the two lines of the cursus curiae are
acceptable. The matter at issue is whether mental injury is actu-
ally a physical injury in a medical sense. If this question is de-
cided in the affirmative, there would be no need to sustain the
debates that have prevailed over the thread of cases that have
run through this contentious issue.
It is interesting to note that in the case of Floyd v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc.'3 0 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined l-
sion corporelle in the original French text and decided that the
legislative history of the Convention and the case law admitted
of mental injury, even without accompanying physical injury, be-
ing compensable under Article 17. This is the only early in-
stance of a court transcending the bounds of judicial
126 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
127 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861).
128 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
- This somewhat parochial view was followed in the cases of Karfunkel v. Com-
pagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and Krystal v. British
Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal 1975). Herman v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), and Palagonia v. Trans World
Airlines, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), were two further instances of
mental injury being included in the rubric of physical injury.
130 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
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parochialism and actually recognizing that there are other fields
of human expertise that become relevant in the adjudication of
human disputes.
Mankiewicz, in a well reasoned and aufait paper refers to the
concept of "personal injury" in the Guatemala Protocol (which
was also suggested at the Hague Protocol 1955), and suggests
the following viable compromise: "The legislative history of Arti-
cle 17 compels the conclusion that, at least as far as American
courts are concerned, the expression 'lesion corporelle' should
be understood to mean 'personal injury.'"1 3 1
It is somewhat disturbing that some recent cases have still
held on to the need for accompanying physical injury in order
for emotional injury to be compensable. In the 1997 Australian
case of Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd.,3 2 the New South
Wales Court of Appeal followed the Floyd decision and held that
without accompanying bodily injury, the plaintiff could not re-
cover for pure psychological injury. The plaintiff in this case
had claimed that she had suffered acute nervous shock and
feared for her life following a fire which broke in the engine of
the aircraft in which she was traveling, while at the Athens air-
port. The Court of Appeal went on the basis that the signatory
states to the Warsaw Convention in 1929 had no specific intent
to include pure psychological or emotional distress within the
purview of Article 17 of the Convention. 133 The Court of Appeal
in the Kotsambasis case disagreed with the lower court judges'
finding with an earlier Australian decision1 3 4 that was in the ap-
pellate process at the time the Kotsambasis case was being de-
cided. Although the New South Wales Court of Appeal
conclusively decided at the appeal of the Georgeopoulos case that
pure mental distress was comparable without there being a need
for accompanying physical injury, the Kotsambasis decision over-
ruled it.
In the Untied States, although few instances of judicial deter-
mination following Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.1 35 support the
131 Ren6 H. Mankiewicz, The Application of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to
Mental Suffering Not Related to Physical Injury, in 4 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW,
187, 192 (Nicolas Mateesco Matte ed., 1979).
132 (1997) 140 F.L.R. 318. See also David B. Johnston, Article 17-Australian
Court Holds that Damages for Pure Psychological Injury Not Recoverable in Warsaw Con-
vention Cases, 16 AVIATION INSURANCE AND LAW, 166 (1997).
133 Johnston, supra note 132, at 166.
134 Georgeopoulos v. America Airlines, Inc., (unreported, Supreme Court,
NSW, Ireland J, 10 December 1993).
135 872 F.2d 1462 (1lth Cir. 1989).
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view that plaintiffs could recover only for physical injuries and
for emotional injuries flowing from those injuries,136 the 1996
decision of Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.137 gave the United
States Supreme Court the opportunity to confirm that the War-
saw Convention itself contained no specific or particular preclu-
sion from recovering compensation from any damages, be it
physical or mental. The Zicherman decision allowed the plaintiff
to claim for legally cognizable harm to be determined by local
law in accordance with otherwise applicable choice of law princi-
ples. A year later, the 1997 decision of In re Aircrash Disaster near
Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994138 held with the Supreme
Court findings in the Zicherman case, stating that "Article 17
does not say that a carrier will only be liable for damage caused
by a bodily injury, or that passengers can only recover for mental
injuries if they are caused by bodily injuries." 13 9
The aviation community has now reached a stage where the
cursus curiae at common law such as the Floyd and Zicherman deci-
sions would be moot in the context of the ICAO Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air,
which was adopted at Montreal through a diplomatic Confer-
ence held between May 10-28, 1999. This Convention blazes a
new trail, and provides the judiciary with the travaux preparatoires
of the Conference as resource material. Courts would no longer
have to inquire as to the intent of the makers of the original
Warsaw Convention of 1929, since the 1999 ICAO Convention
would pre-empt its predecessor.
In terms of the element of mental injury, it is very clear that
the working papers of the Study Group, which was appointed by
the ICAO Council in November 1995 for the specific purpose of
developing a mechanism within the framework of ICAO to ac-
celerate the modernization of the Warsaw system, are explicit in
reflecting the Group's intentions. Vijay Poonoosamy, the Rap-
porteur of the Study Group, in his report states:
the expression personal injury would open the door to non-phys-
ical personal injuries such as slander, libel, discrimination, fear,
fright and apprehension and this could be neither desirable nor
acceptable. Use of bodily injury would be more acceptable but
136 See Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Tseng v.
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
137 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
138 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
139 Id. at 179.
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would exclude mental injuries such as shock. Recent Court deci-
sions in the U.S. demonstrates how difficult an area this is and a
clear statement must be agreed upon which is not limitless in
scope. Since it would be clearly fair and equitable to compensate
for impairment of health (i.e. both physical and mental/psychic
injuries) it may be preferable to define personal injury as such.140
It is interesting to note that the Rapporteur, on behalf of the
ICAO Study Group, categorizes fear, fright and apprehension,
which are symptoms of injury that bring about physical results as
shown in the scientific evidence at the Introduction of this arti-
cle, as non-physical injuries. He then goes on to identify shock
as a mental injury.
The ICAO Legal Committee, which examined the report of
the Study Group, retained the phrase "mental injury" in Article
16 of the ICAO Draft Convention. 4 ' However, the Convention
of 1999, in Article 17.1, provides that "The carrier is liable for
damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passen-
ger upon condition only that the accident which caused the
death or injury took place onboard the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.' '14 2
It is interesting that the Draft Convention which was consid-
ered by the Conference had this provision in Article 16.1 with
an additional sentence at the end stating, "However, the carrier
is not liable to the extent that the death or injury resulted from
the state of health of the passenger."' 43
Both in the draft, and in the final version of the Convention,
the words "personal" and "mental" have been stricken out of the
original phrase "personal bodily or mental injury," making it in-
controvertible that the new Convention does not intend to en-
compass mental injury as a compensable element in Article 16.
This exclusion, ipsofacto, would give the courts clear direction as
to the way to proceed in an adjudication involving mental injury
in the carriage by air of a person, except that it is not clear
whether by the exclusion of the word "mental injury," the Con-
vention also wished to exclude "the impairment of mental
health," which can be imputed as being inclusionary in the
working papers of the ICAO Study Groups. It would not be sur-
14 The Modernization of the Warsaw System-The ICAO Draft Convention on the Lia-
bility of the Air Carrier, AviATION Q., Part 5, July 1997, p 286 at p. 298-99.
141 See id. at 313.
142 Convention, supra note 1.
143 Draft Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air, Reference Text, DCW Doc No. 5. 5/3/99, ICAO; Montreal.
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prising if this dichotomy were to create in the future two schools
of judicial thought, as indeed existed under the 1929 Warsaw
Convention and its Protocols. Under the circumstances, this
could not be helped, as the Montreal Convention has seemingly
adopted the most prudent approach of leaving the issue open.
Thus, there could also well be a line of reasoning, as in the
Zicherman case, which would insist on interpreting "bodily in-
jury" as extending to "legally cognizable harm" thereby ex-
tending the phrase to mental injury.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that medical science has clearly identified
mental disturbance. Modern science has debunked the legal at-
titude which was brought about by the requirement that physi-
cal injury is an essential prerequisite of mental injury. It is now
believed by medical science that the mental injury that a victim
suffers can be extreme. Although it is caused by fear, in most
cases it is not mere fright or nervous shock but also an extreme
form of neurosis 44 which follows the traumatic event of an acci-
dent. Neurosis in its extreme form is a psychogenic disorder
following a psychic injury with or without physical harm. 145 It
results in considerable impairment of the ability to function in
ordinary life. Generally, it is precipitated by a traumatic inci-
dent and is solely due to psychological reactions, which make
external physical injury a totally unrelated factor.
It is not surprising that, as far back as in 1939, the courts pro-
nounced that "we need the privilege of being careless whether
we inflict mental distress on our neighbors."146 The courts
viewed mental injury as no redressable injury. The unfortunate
thing is that although in many areas of the law academic opin-
ion and judicial decisions have been symbiotic, the courts did
not heed the comments of Prosser,141 Bohlen, 4 " and many
others 4 9 who at an early stage recognized mental injury as an
- SeeJ. Mark Hart, Neurosis Following Trauma: A Dark Horse in the Field of Mental
Disturbance, 8 CuMB. L. Ruv. 495 (1997).
145 See id. at 497.
-4 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., 105 F.2d 62, 64
(D.C. Cir. 1939).
147 See HANDBOOK, supra note 15 at 327.
148 See Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence With-
out Impact, 41 N.S. AM. L. REG. 141 (1902).
-4 See Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L.
REv. 497 (1922); Fowler v. Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the
Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 426 (1938); Calvert Ma-
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independent injury which infringes the interest of peace of
mind. The only conclusion that can be reached is that the
courts have not taken the trouble to seek a definition for mental
injury and this had made their treatment of the injury mis-
guided and often erroneous. As pointed out earlier, a minority
of jurisdictions have, notwithstanding this general attitude, been
courageous enough to say that it is a definite and identifiable
injury.
The courts should primarily consider the meaning and pur-
pose of the law when dealing with mental injury and accident
liability. To say that it is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it'50 is a legal platitude. If the injury suf-
fered by a plaintiff is proved by connecting it to an accident,
there is no doubt that the injury is a wrong that needs correc-
tion by way of awarding damages to the plaintiff.
There is little room for doubt that most common law courts
would readily regard Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD),
which is a relatively new phenomenon (earlier referred to by the
medical profession as whiplash injuries), as a legally cognizable
harm. PTSD excludes mental injury caused as a result of a per-
son's death by natural causes, such as witnessing the death of a
family member under natural circumstances. It includes mental
injury or distress caused by witnessing sudden events such as ac-
cidents, natural disasters, and instances of armed combat. Typi-
cal symptoms of PTSD are recurrent and persistent
experiencing of an event in question; exclusion of the outside
world when experiencing such recurrences of events in one's
mind; avoidance of circumstances needing change; and in-
creased discombobulation and disturbance of mind, resulting in
such experiences as lack of sleep and temper tantrums.1 5 ' The
facta probanda, or elements of proof needed to establish PTSD,
are in an aircraft accident: (1) the fact that the claimant is suf-
fering from PTSD, (2) such PTSD has been brought about by
shock caused by experiencing the event of an accident or other
incident calculated to induce such a psychiatric disorder, and
(3) the close proximity of the claimant to the accident site. The
issue as to whether the courts would associate PTSD with bodily
injury as envisioned in the present Warsaw structure or even the
gruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033
(1936).
150 See HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 54.
151 See Mark Franklin, Liability in Negligence for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Avi-
ATION Q., Part 3, January 1997, 172 at 173.
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new regime reflected in the Convention proposed by ICAO
would largely depend on the extent to which courts would be
ready to embrace the compelling scientific findings with regard
to mental distress and its application within the term "bodily
injury."
In the United States, torts became a distinct area of the law
only in the late nineteenth century. It has been regarded as a
flexible discipline where rigid distinctions are impossible to
make. Inflexible principles and conservatism have no place in
the rapidly evolving tort law in America. 5 2 One writer 15 3 has
aptly commented that due to this progressive evolution of tort
law, the common law in time to come would entertain mental
distress actions freely. The immunities given to the injurer
under fault liability would gradually disappear. The reason for
this is quite clear. In a civil wrong such as a tort, the law now
seeks to correct a wrong rather than punish a wrongdoer. for
this purpose there is no need to depend on fault liability as the
sole criterion of deciding an action in mental distress. The only
thing necessary is to determine that the victim is free of fault
and that the defendant was responsible in some way for the in-
jury caused. The law itself on this matter should be based heav-
ily on social welfare. It is inevitable that eventually the courts
will follow this trend, taking into account social policy and the
interests of society as a whole, and compensate injury, whether
mental or physical, in an appropriate manner.
152 N. Green, Proximate and Remote Cause (in essays) at 1.
153 See Willard H. Pedrick, Does Tort Law Have A Future?, 39 OHIO ST. L.J., 782,
784 (1978).
2000]
t OD
